Jo jo
Det er 2`den styrmanden og 3`die styrmanden man hører - her er et fragment fra rapporten der beskriver den detalie
Citér:
The first Mayday call was received from the ESTONIA at about 0122 hrs, i.e. at about the same time as the lifeboat alarm was given and just after the main engines had stopped. It was a very brief message, containing no other information than the word “Mayday” and the name ESTONIA. The operator has been identified by voice as second officer A on duty. In later radio traffic the operator has been identified as the third officer. A voice heard in the background has been identified as the chief officer's. He and the third officer had come to the bridge obviously alarmed.
 The time for the distress traffic, from the first call to the last, was eight minutes. Nothing is mentioned to indicate that the officers had any appreciation of what had caused the vessel to develop a list and take in water. The information given was1: “Yes, we have a problem here now, a bad list to starboard. I believe that it was twenty, thirty degrees” followed later on by “We have black out” and, at the end of the distress traffic, “Really bad, it looks really bad here now”. It was about seven minutes before the Estonia gave her position. Due to the very fast development of the accident the late start of the distress traffic did not, however, have much effect on the final outcome of the rescue operation. The distress traffic is reproduced in full in 7.3.3. Figure 13.5 illustrates the development of the list during the distress traffic as experienced on the bridge.
Figure 13.5 Development of the list as observed on the bridge.
 Of the five officers known to have been on the bridge, second officer A and the third officer were seen leaving the bridge in the final stage of the accident. It is believed that the master, the chief officer and the fourth officer remained on the bridge throughout the accident. This assumption is also supported by the fact that three bodies were seen inside the bridge during the diving investigation.
The two officers that left the bridge were later seen distributing lifejackets and trying to launch lifeboats and rafts. Also the boatswain, who just before the start of the accident was called out to help investigate the sounds on the car deck, was seen on deck 7 taking part in this.
It is noteworthy that so little exchange of information seems to have taken place between the bridge and the engine control room during the development of the accident. The third engineer did not inform the bridge about the inflow of water he observed (see 6.2.3). Nor did the officers of the watch call him for an assessment of the situation. If the observation on the monitor had been discussed and evaluated immediately, there could still have been a possibility to influence the development of the accident.
Nothing indicates that the officers realised that the bow was fully open, although it must have been obvious that the situation was very serious, and that the survival of the vessel was threatened.
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"Hvorfor er der aldrig tid nok til at lave det ordentligt første gang - men altid tid nok til at lave det om igen"
"Any Grease is better than no Grease at all"
Nuværende både
Bayliner 175 br 2007 m mercruiser 3,0 / Alpha Gen2
Buster S m 15 hk evinrude 1991
Ryds 14`m Husqvarna 4 hk 1958
Nuværende Motorer
Johnson 5,5 1959
Johnson 3 hk 1957
Johnson 3 hk 1967
OMC el påhængsmotor
Husqvarna 4 hk 1958
Penta U21 1937
Mercruiser 135 2007
Evinrude 15 1991
Tidligere både og motorer
Tabur Yak 3 m 3 hk Johnson 1961
Shetland 536 m Suzuki 65 og 85 hk
Shetland 570 m 200 hk Johnson
Trifoil 14 m 30 hk Suzuki DT30C
Trifoil 14 "de luxe" m Suzuki DF30T
Ukendt jolle m Johnson 9,9
Gummibåd m 3 hk johnson
Honda 75 hk 1996
Sea Nymph 14 R m Suzuki DT30T og johnson 9,9
Og sikkert nogle flere jeg har glemt
